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 NOTE 
Causation Confusion: Missouri’s Adoption 
of a Contributing Factor Standard for 
Workers’ Compensation Retaliation Claims 
Templemire v. W&M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
SUZANNE L. SPECKER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“There is nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more 
disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion[,] 
than causation.”1  Causation within the context of workers’ compensation law 
is no exception.2  Chapter 287 of the Missouri Revised Statutes is known as 
“The Missouri Workers’ Compensation Act.”3  Section 287.780 of the Act 
grants workers a civil right to recover against an employer who wrongfully 
discharges or discriminates against a worker for exercising her rights under 
Chapter 287, such as when a worker files a workers’ compensation claim.4  
Rather than shedding light on the causation confusion, Section 287.780 only 
further contributes to it; the statute’s plain language is silent on the requisite 
standard of causation that a worker must satisfy to recover, leaving it up to 
Missouri courts to determine the appropriate causation standard.5 
For decades, courts applied an exclusive cause standard to Section 
287.780 claims.6  Under the exclusive cause standard, a worker could recover 
for wrongful termination only if the worker could demonstrate that the exer-
cising of his rights under Chapter 287 was the exclusive cause for the em-
 
* B.A., Washington University in St. Louis, 2010; J.D. Candidate, University of Mis-
souri School of Law, 2016; Missouri Law Review, Lead Articles Editor, 2015-2016; 
Associate Member, 2014-2015.  Special thanks to Professor Rafael Gely for his guid-
ance and suggestions throughout the writing process, the editors of the Missouri Law 
Review for their time and feedback, and my husband for his unwavering support. 
 1. Templemire v. W&M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371, 382 (Mo. 2014) (en 
banc) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 41, at 263 (5th 
ed. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 2. See id. at 382. 
 3. N. Drew Kemp, Note, “Exclusively” Confusing: Who Has Jurisdiction to 
Determine Jurisdiction Under the Missouri Workers’ Compensation Law?, 78 MO. L. 
REV. 897, 897 (2013). 
 4. See MO. REV. STAT. § 287.780 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 5. See id. 
 6. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
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ployer’s decision to terminate him.7  Thus, the worker could not recover if the 
employer could demonstrate any other valid and non-pretextual reason for 
termination, even if the employer’s decision was significantly influenced by 
the worker’s exercise of his rights under Chapter 287.8 
As this Note argues, the exclusive cause standard frustrated the statute’s 
purpose and effectively sanctioned employer discrimination and retaliation 
against employees who filed workers’ compensation claims.9  In Templemire 
v. W&M Welding, Inc., the Supreme Court of Missouri corrected this mistake 
by adopting the “contributing factor” causation standard in lieu of the exclu-
sive cause standard.10  In Part II, this Note analyzes the facts and holding of 
Templemire v. W&M Welding, Inc.11  Next, in Part III, this Note explores the 
legal background of Missouri’s workers’ compensation laws, the historical 
context and policy considerations behind the development of Section 
287.780, and the judicial interpretations of Section 287.780’s causation ele-
ment.12  Part IV examines the court’s rationale in Templemire.13  Lastly, Part 
V assesses the validity of employer concerns about the implications that may 
arise from the standard’s adoption; provides guidance for employers grap-
pling with how to respond proactively; and considers the pending legislation 
that, if passed, would overrule Templemire.14  This Note concludes by dis-
cussing what Missouri’s adoption of the contributing factor standard repre-
sents for Missouri employment discrimination law going forward.15 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Defendant employer W&M Welding, Inc. (“W&M”), located in Sedalia, 
Missouri, offers a variety of welding and construction-related services as well 
as machinery and tool rentals.16  In October 2005, W&M hired Plaintiff John 
Templemire to work as a painter and general laborer for approximately $8.50 
per hour.17  During his employment, Templemire was generally considered a 
good employee.18  While working at W&M on January 9, 2006, however, a 
 
 7. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 8. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 9. See discussion infra Part V.C. 
 10. 433 S.W.3d 371, 384 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
 11. See discussion infra Part II. 
 12. See discussion infra Part III. 
 13. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 14. See discussion infra Part V. 
 15. See discussion infra Part VI. 
 16. Services, W&M WELDING, INC., http://www.wmwelding.com/services (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2015). 
 17. Brief of Appellant John Templemire at 3, Templemire v. W&M Welding, 
Inc., No. WD 74681, 2012 WL 2153833 (Mo. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2012), rev’d, 433 
S.W.3d 371 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
 18. Id.  This opinion was articulated by Templemire’s supervisor who had no 
criticism of Templemire’s work performance.  Id. 
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large beam fell and crushed Templemire’s left foot, severely injuring him.19  
His injury required surgery and the installation of plating and screws.20  After 
reporting his injury to W&M, Templemire filed a workers’ compensation 
claim and received benefits.21 
Due to his injury, Templemire was absent from work for approximately 
four weeks after the incident.22  He returned to work with various physician-
imposed restrictions, including wearing a protective boot on his injured 
foot.23  In July 2006, Templemire’s doctor further restricted Templemire to 
seated work because of continuing surgery complications.24  Although the 
seated work restriction was removed in September 2006, Templemire’s doc-
tor ordered Templemire to avoid standing for longer than one hour without a 
fifteen-minute break to elevate his foot.25  To accommodate these restrictions, 
W&M’s owner, Gary McMullin, placed Templemire on light duty by making 
him a tool room assistant.26 
On the morning of November 29, 2006, a customer requested that 
W&M wash and paint a railing for pick-up that afternoon.27  According to 
Templemire, his supervisor instructed him to wash the railing later, after it 
had been prepared for washing.28  Around 1:50 p.m., Templemire walked 
toward the wash bay to wash the railing but stopped to rest his foot, which 
was infected.29  While taking this break, McMullin began cursing30 at Tem-
plemire for failing to wash the railing.31  Templemire attempted to explain 
that the railing had only just arrived in the wash bay and that he planned to 
wash it immediately after his break.32  McMullin fired Templemire on the 
spot, disregarding W&M’s progressive disciplinary policy.33  After leaving 
the worksite, Templemire contacted Liz Gragg, the insurance adjuster on his 
workers’ compensation claim.34  When Gragg later called McMullin to dis-
 
 19. Templemire v. W&M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371, 373 (Mo. 2014) (en 
banc). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 373-74. 
 24. Id. at 374. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. When Templemire asked McMullin whether he was sure about firing him 
because he would “go home and call workman’s [sic] comp,” McMullin replied that 
he “d[id]n’t give a f— what [Templemire did]” because the employment site was 
“[his] f—ing place.”  Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 374-75. 
 34. Id. at 374. 
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cuss Templemire’s discharge, McMullin “went on a [tirade] about [Temple-
mire] ‘milking’ his injury and [said] that [Templemire could] sue him for 
whatever.”35 
Subsequently, Templemire filed suit against W&M in the Circuit Court 
of Pettis County, Missouri.36  Templemire brought his claim under Missouri 
Revised Statute Section 287.780,37 alleging that W&M fired him in retalia-
tion for filing a workers’ compensation claim.38  At trial, McMullin contra-
dicted Templemire’s version of events by testifying that McMullin had 
placed the railing in the wash bay early that morning and had personally di-
rected Templemire to wash the railing immediately, ignoring other assign-
ments until he was finished.39  McMullin contended that he returned two 
hours later to discover the railing still unwashed and Templemire taking a 
break.40  According to McMullin, Templemire responded that he needed his 
break and that McMullin could “take it up with [his doctor].”41  In response, 
McMullin alleged that he terminated Templemire for insubordination.42 
Templemire provided evidence that McMullin referred to injured em-
ployees as “whiners” and had yelled at him because of his injury.43  One wit-
ness testified to overhearing Templemire and McMullin arguing just prior to 
Templemire’s termination with McMullin yelling, “All you do is sit on your 
a— and draw my money.”44  Templemire also presented evidence that anoth-
er employee was never fired, despite receiving multiple disciplinary write-ups 
and having a drug problem; in contrast, Templemire had only ever received 
one45 disciplinary write-up.46 
Before the case was submitted to the jury, W&M proposed using Mis-
souri Approved Instructions47 (“MAI”) 23.13.48  This verdict director re-
 
 35. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 36. Id. 
 37. That statute provides the following: “No employer or agent shall discharge or 
in any way discriminate against any employee for exercising any of his rights under 
this chapter.  Any employee who has been discharged or discriminated against shall 
have a civil action for damages against his employer.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 287.780 
(Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 38. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 374. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 374-75. 
 42. Id. at 375. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Templemire’s only write-up was for “failing to wear a paint mask while in 
the paint booth.”  Id. 
 46. Id.; Templemire v. W&M Welding, Inc., No. WD 74681, 2012 WL 6681950, 
at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2012), rev’d, 433 S.W.3d 371 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
        47.  “MAI” refers to the Missouri Approved Instructions, the jury instructions 
used in Missouri.  See Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 376.  MAI 38.04 has since replaced 
MAI 23.13.  Id. at 375 n.3. 
 48. Id. at 375. 
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quired the jury to find for W&M unless Templemire’s filing of a workers’ 
compensation claim was the “exclusive49 factor” in W&M’s decision to ter-
minate him.50  Templemire, however, contended that by using an exclusive 
factor standard, W&M’s proposed jury instruction misstated the law.51  For 
this reason, Templemire proposed a modified version of MAI 23.13, substi-
tuting a contributing factor standard for the MAI’s exclusive factor stand-
ard.52  In the alternative, Templemire submitted a pretext instruction, which 
advised the jury that if it found W&M’s stated reason for firing Templemire 
to be mere pretext, the jury could find exclusive causation in favor of Tem-
plemire.53  The trial court refused both of Templemire’s proposed instructions 
and instead instructed the jury on MAI 23.13’s exclusive factor standard.54  
The jury returned a verdict for W&M.55 
Templemire appealed to the Western District of the Missouri Court of 
Appeals, alleging that the trial court erred by rejecting both of his proposed 
instructions.56  Applying the standard first articulated by the Supreme Court 
of Missouri in Hansome v. Northwestern Cooperage Company,57 the Court of 
Appeals determined that the trial court was correct in using the exclusive 
causation standard.58 
In the alternative, Templemire argued that the trial court erred by refus-
ing to submit his pretext instruction.59  Templemire contended that without a 
pretext instruction, the exclusive causation standard required the jury to find 
that if there was any other possible reason for his discharge other than retalia-
 
 49. The trial court rejected Templemire’s proposed verdict director, which stat-
ed: 
On the claim of plaintiff for compensatory damages for retaliatory discharge 
against defendant, your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe: 
 First, plaintiff was employed by defendant, and 
 Second, plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim, and 
 Third, defendant discharged plaintiff, and 
Fourth, plaintiff’s filing of the workers’ compensation claim was a con-
tributing factor in such discharge, 
and 
Fifth, as a direct result of such discharge plaintiff sustained damage. 
Id. at 375 n.4 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 50. Id. at 375. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Templemire v. W&M Welding, Inc., No. WD 74681, 2012 WL 6681950, at 
*1 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2012), rev’d, 433 S.W.3d 371 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
 57. 679 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. 1984) (en banc), overruled by Templemire, 443 
S.W.3d 371. 
 58. Templemire, 2012 WL 6681950, at *5. 
 59. Id. at *3. 
5
Specker: Specker: Causation Confusion
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
584 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
tion, then W&M was entitled to a verdict.60  The appellate court disagreed, 
however, because Templemire failed to satisfy “his burden to demonstrate 
that the MAI instructions submitted actually misstate[d] the law.”61  The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that a pretext 
instruction was not required, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to give one.62 
After the Court of Appeals issued its opinion, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri granted transfer.63  The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, 
holding that to prove a claim under Section 287.780, an employee must prove 
that her filing of a workers’ compensation claim was a “contributing factor” 
to the employer’s discrimination or the employer’s decision to discharge the 
employee.64  The Supreme Court further held that Hansome and Crabtree v. 
Bugby were overruled to the extent that their holdings were inconsistent with 
the court’s decision.65 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In this Part, Section A surveys the development of Missouri’s workers’ 
compensation laws, including the public-policy exception to Missouri’s at-
will employment doctrine and the statutory exceptions under the Missouri 
Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) and Section 287.780 of the Missouri Workers’ 
Compensation Act.  Section B discusses the historical context and policy 
considerations behind Missouri’s workers’ compensation law, the develop-
ment of Section 287.780, and the proposed amendments to Section 287.780.  
Finally, Section C discusses judicial interpretations of Section 287.780’s cau-
sation element.  Specifically, Section C examines Missouri Court of Appeals 
and Supreme Court of Missouri decisions relating to the appropriate causa-
tion standard in employment discrimination cases, including those brought 
under workers’ compensation law and the MHRA. 
A.  The At-Will Employment Doctrine and Its Exceptions 
Generally, Missouri’s at-will employment doctrine holds that an em-
ployer may terminate an at-will employee “for any reason,” including no 
reason at all.66  Several public-policy and statutory exceptions to this general 
 
 60. Id. at *5. 
 61. Id. at *6. 
 62. Id. at *7. 
 63. Templemire v. W&M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371, 375 (Mo. 2014) (en 
banc).  The case was transferred in accordance with Article Five of the Missouri Con-
stitution.  Id. (citing MO. CONST. art. V, § 10). 
 64. Id. at 384-86. 
 65. Id. at 382. 
 66. Keveney v. Mo. Military Acad., 304 S.W.3d 98, 101 (Mo. 2010) (en banc). 
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rule do exist, however.67  Beginning in 1985 with Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, 
Inc., the Missouri Court of Appeals first articulated what the Boyle court de-
scribed as a “narrow” public-policy exception to the at-will employment doc-
trine.68  The Supreme Court of Missouri, however, did not explicitly recog-
nize this exception until nearly twenty-five years later in Fleshner v. Pepose 
Vision Institute, P.C.69  Additional exceptions to the at-will employment doc-
trine were later established in the MHRA, which mandates that employers 
cannot terminate their employees, including at-will employees, on the basis 
of “race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age, or disability.”70 
Another statutory exception to Missouri’s at-will employment doctrine, 
much like the public-policy exception under tort law that was articulated in 
Boyle and Fleshner, is codified in Missouri Revised Statute Section 
287.780.71  This Section requires: “No employer or agent shall discharge or in 
any way discriminate against any employee for exercising any of his rights 
under this chapter.  Any employee who has been discharged or discriminated 
against shall have a civil action for damages against his employer.”72  The 
application of this statutory exception to workers’ compensation retaliation 
claims, specifically the statute’s silence on the matter of causation, has pro-
duced considerable confusion within the courts.73 
 
 67. See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text. 
 68. 700 S.W.2d 859, 871 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).  The Court of Appeals first laid 
out this exception, stating: 
[W]here an employer has discharged an at-will employee because that em-
ployee refused to violate the law or any well established and clear mandate of 
public policy as expressed in the constitution, statutes and regulations promul-
gated pursuant to statute, or because the employee reported to his superiors or 
to public authorities serious midconduct [sic] that constitutes violations of the 
law and of such well established and clearly mandated public policy, the em-
ployee has a cause of action in tort for damages for wrongful discharge. 
Id. at 878. 
 69. 304 S.W.3d 81, 91-92 (Mo. 2010) (en banc).  The Supreme Court of Mis-
souri expressly adopted the public-policy exception under tort law, stating: 
An at-will employee may not be terminated (1) for refusing to violate the law 
or any well-established and clear mandate of public policy as expressed in the 
constitution, statutes, regulations promulgated pursuant to statute, or rules cre-
ated by a governmental body or (2) for reporting wrongdoing or violations of 
law to superiors or public authorities.  If an employer terminates an employee 
for either reason, then the employee has a cause of action in tort for wrongful 
discharge based on the public-policy exception. 
Id. at 92 (internal citations omitted). 
 70. Id. at 95 (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 213.055.1 (2000)). 
 71. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.780 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
7
Specker: Specker: Causation Confusion
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
586 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
B.  The Policy Considerations Underlying Missouri Workers’       
Compensation Law 
Significant policy considerations supported the Missouri Legislature’s 
adoption of Chapter 287.74  For instance, in 1921 an estimated 25,000 Mis-
souri employees were killed or injured at their jobs.75  Of those employees, a 
shocking eighty percent received no compensation whatsoever.76  In 1925, 
with the stated purpose of “remedy[ing] the harsh effects of inadequate re-
coveries by workmen against their employers under common law tort doc-
trines,” the Missouri Legislature adopted the Missouri Workers’ Compensa-
tion Act (the “Act”).77  The Act remains part of Missouri’s original workers’ 
compensation law,78 and its original version required that it “be liberally con-
strued with a view to the public welfare.”79 
Although the Act’s passage better ensured that workers would be com-
pensated for their work-related injuries, the law provided little protection 
from employer retaliation in response to workers filing compensation 
claims.80  For instance, under the 1925 version of Section 287.780, an em-
ployer who wrongfully discharged an at-will employee was reprimanded with 
mere misdemeanor violations.81  The General Assembly addressed this prob-
lem in 1973 by amending the statute to grant workers the right to file a civil 
action for damages for wrongful discharge.82  In 2005, the Act was further 
amended “to provide that its provisions [must] be construed strictly and to 
require the evidence to be weighed impartially.”83  The 2005 revisions nar-
 
 74. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. 
 75. Todd v. Goostree, 493 S.W.2d 411, 416 n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973), superseded 
by statute, Missouri Employers Mutual Insurance Company Act, S.B. 251, 87th Gen. 
Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1993). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 416; see also State ex rel. Elsas v. Mo. Workmen’s Comp. Comm’n, 2 
S.W.2d 796, 797 (Mo. 1928) (en banc). 
 78. Christy v. Petrus, 295 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Mo. 1956) (en banc). 
 79. MO. REV. STAT. § 3764 (1939), amended by MO. REV. STAT. § 287.800 
(Supp. 2005); see also Maltz v. Jackoway-Katz Cap Co., 82 S.W.2d 909, 911 (Mo. 
1934) (noting that the Workmen’s Compensation Act must be liberally construed). 
 80. The 1925 version of Section 287.780 provided: 
Every employer, his director, officer or agent, who discharges or in any way 
discriminates against an employee for exercising any of his rights under this 
chapter, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof 
shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty nor more than five hundred 
dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than one week nor 
more than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment. 
MO. REV. STAT. § 3725 (1939), amended by MO. REV. STAT. § 287.780 (Cum. Supp. 
2013). 
 81. MO. REV. STAT. § 3725 (1939). 
 82. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.780 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 83. Miller v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 287 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Mo. 
2009) (en banc). 
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rowed the Act’s scope, effectively limiting the broad coverage that workers 
had previously enjoyed.84  The text of the 1973 version of Section 287.780, 
however, was left unchanged and remains in effect today.85 
Missouri’s 2014 General Assembly recently sought to amend Section 
287.780 by clarifying the causation standard required for workers’ compensa-
tion retaliation claims.86  Missouri House Bill No. 1468 (“HB 1468”) sought 
to replace Section 287.780 with the following: 
287.780. No employer or agent shall discharge or [in any way] 
discriminate against any employee for exercising any of his or her 
rights under this chapter when the exercising of such rights is the 
exclusive cause of the discharge or discrimination.  Any employ-
ee who has been discharged or discriminated against in such man-
ner shall have a civil action for damages against his employer.87 
Although HB 1468 died in committee,88 this issue may be taken up 
again in the future.  Analysis of this bill and its potential implications is dis-
cussed in more detail in Part V. 
C.  The Evolution of the Appropriate Causation Standard 
Mitchell v. St. Louis County was the first case to apply the 1973 amend-
ed Section 287.780 to a plaintiff employee’s claim for wrongful termination 
in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim.89  In that 1978 deci-
sion, the Eastern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court’s entry of a directed verdict for the employer.90  The court reasoned that 
the employer presented sufficient evidence for a valid and non-pretextual 
motive for terminating the employee because of the employee’s frequent ab-
sences from work.91  The court provided further guidance that a civil action 
under Section 287.780 exists only if the “employee [was] discharged discrim-
inatorily by reason of exercising his or her rights” under workers’ compensa-
tion law.92 
Next, in 1983, Davis v. Richmond Special Road District interpreted Sec-
tion 287.780, specifically construing the plaintiff employee’s burden to 
demonstrate a causal connection between his or her termination and the filing 
 
 84. See, e.g., Johme v. St. John’s Mercy Healthcare, 366 S.W.3d 504, 513 (Mo. 
2012) (en banc) (Teitelman, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he 2005 amendments certainly 
were drafted to limit worker’s compensation awards.”). 
 85. § 287.780. 
 86. See H.B. 1468, 97th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2014). 
 87. Id. (emphasis added). 
 88. Id. 
 89. 575 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). 
 90. Id. at 814. 
 91. Id. at 815-16. 
 92. Id. at 815. 
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of his or her workers’ compensation claim.93  The Davis court construed the 
legislative intent behind Section 287.780 as “authoriz[ing] recovery for dam-
ages if, upon proof, it [could] be shown that the employee was discriminated 
against or discharged simply because of the exercise of his or her rights re-
garding a workers’ compensation claim.”94  Later that same year, in Hansome 
v. Northwestern Cooperage Co., the Supreme Court of Missouri, relying ex-
clusively95 on Mitchell and Davis, outlined the four elements96 required for a 
plaintiff employee to prove a claim under Section 287.780.97  Without provid-
ing any statutory interpretation or analysis for the fourth element of causa-
tion, the court put forth the appropriate causation standard as requiring “an 
exclusive causal relationship between [the] plaintiff’s actions and [the] de-
fendant’s actions.”98  As its sole explanation for adopting the exclusive causa-
tion standard, the court stated, “Causality does not exist if the basis for dis-
charge is valid and non-pretextual.”99 
Fourteen years later, the Supreme Court of Missouri reaffirmed Han-
some’s exclusive causation standard by applying it to the Section 287.780 
claim in Crabtree v. Bugby.100  Judge White disagreed with the Crabtree ma-
jority, however, contending: 
[S]ection [287.780] does not contain any language suggesting that an 
employee is entitled to an action when they have been discharged 
“solely” or “exclusively” because they sought the protection afforded 
by workers’ compensation.  At a minimum, an employee has suffered 
discrimination when the employee is discharged even in part for filing 
a claim.101 
Judge White further noted the flaws in Hansome’s decision, emphasiz-
ing that “[t]he ‘exclusive’ language in Hansome appear[ed] to have been 
 
 93. 649 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). 
 94. Id. (emphasis added). 
 95. In listing the four elements, the Hansome court neglected to analyze or inter-
pret Section 287.780.  See 679 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Mo. 1983) (en banc), overruled by 
Templemire v. W&M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371 (Mo. 2014) (en banc).  Instead, 
the court merely cited Mitchell and Davis for support that exclusive causation was the 
appropriate standard.  See id. 
 96. The first three elements are “(1) plaintiff’s status as employee of defendant 
before injury, (2) plaintiff’s exercise of a right granted by Chapter 287, (3) employ-
er’s discharge of or discrimination against plaintiff.”  Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Davis, 649 S.W.2d 252; Mitchell v. St. Louis 
Cnty., 575 S.W.2d 813 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978)). 
 99. Id. at 275 n.2. 
 100. 967 S.W.2d 66, 70 (Mo. 1998) (en banc) (citing Hansome, 679 S.W.2d 273, 
275 n.2) (indicating that Section 278.780 requires an “exclusive causal relationship 
between the discharge and the employee’s exercise of rights granted” under Mis-
souri’s workers’ compensation law), overruled by Templemire, 433 S.W.3d 371. 
 101. Id. at 73 (White, J., dissenting). 
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol80/iss2/12
2015] CAUSATION CONFUSION 589 
plucked out of thin air” because none of the court’s cited authority, including 
Mitchell and Davis, used such language.102  Judge White concluded his dis-
sent by deeming Hansome to be “an aberration” that contradicted Chapter 
287’s broad policy goal of protecting workers.103 
For another twelve years, the exclusive causation standard set forth in 
Hansome and its predecessors remained unchallenged.104  Then, in Fleshner 
v. Pepose Vision Institute, P.C., the Supreme Court of Missouri explicitly 
questioned the validity of this standard’s application in the public-policy ex-
ception context.105  On appeal, the employer in Fleshner contended that the 
trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury using Hansome’s exclusive 
causation standard – the same standard applied in prior Missouri decisions on 
wrongful discharge claims under Section 287.780.106  The court disagreed, 
however, noting that Missouri workers’ compensation laws fail to even men-
tion the “exclusive causation” language first adopted in Hansome.107  Further, 
the court noted the distinction between public-policy cases like Fleshner and 
statutorily-based cases brought under Section 287.780 like Hansome.108 
Instead of the exclusive-causation standard, the court in Fleshner adopt-
ed the contributing factor standard for public-policy exception cases.109  To 
arrive at this conclusion, the court considered policy rationales, the causation 
standards in other jurisdictions, and the causation standard used in recent 
Missouri employment discrimination cases.110  First, the court reasoned that 
an exclusive causation standard would discourage employees from reporting 
their employers’ violations because employees would lack protection from 
being terminated.111  Under the exclusive causation standard, employers 
would be entitled to allege that while the employee’s reporting played some 
role in the employer’s decision to fire the employee, some other reason also 
contributed to the decision to terminate, such as tardiness.112  Therefore, the 
employee’s termination would not be exclusively caused by the employee’s 
exercising of her rights under law, and thus, the employer would prevail.113 
 
 102. Id. at 74. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 92-93 (Mo. 2010) 
(en banc) (noting that the Hansome and Crabtree exclusive causation standard had 
continued to be reiterated as the appropriate standard). 
 105. Id. at 93 (“[P]ublic policy requires rejection of ‘exclusive causation’ as the 
proper causal standard for the public-policy exception.”). 
 106. Id. at 92. 
 107. Id. (“Nowhere in the workers’ compensation laws does ‘exclusive causal’ or 
‘exclusive causation’ language appear.”). 
 108. Id. at 93. 
 109. Id. at 95. 
 110. Id. at 92-95. 
 111. Id. at 93. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
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Next, the Fleshner court noted that other jurisdictions had adopted a 
causation standard other than “exclusive cause.”114  Finally, the court analo-
gized the public-policy exception in Fleshner to the MHRA’s employment 
provisions.115  In Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, the court adopted a 
contributing factor standard for proving discrimination under the MHRA.116  
The Fleshner court reasoned that like the public-policy exception, the MHRA 
modifies the at-will employment doctrine by prohibiting employers from 
terminating their employees for improper117 reasons.118  Thus, the Fleshner 
court concluded, both types of cases “turn on whether an illegal factor played 
a role in the decision to discharge the employee.”119  Fleshner ended by ob-
serving that an employer’s action is “no less reprehensible” merely because 
the employer terminates an employee based exclusively on an improper rea-
son versus partially on an improper reason, and the causation standard should 
reflect this principle.120 
This overview of causation standards used in wrongful termination 
claims, whether arising under a public-policy exception, the MHRA, or Sec-
tion 287.780, illustrates the level of variance in causation standards.  In fact, 
the causation standard required in statutory workers’ compensation retaliation 
claims is inconsistent with the causation standard required in other areas of 
Missouri’s employment discrimination law.  With this body of law in mind, 
the Supreme Court of Missouri decided Templemire. 
IV.  THE INSTANT DECISION 
In Templemire v. W&M Welding, Inc., the Supreme Court of Missouri 
held that an employee who brings a wrongful termination claim under Mis-
souri Revised Statute Section 287.780 must demonstrate that his or her filing 
of a workers’ compensation claim was a “contributing factor” to the employ-
 
 114. Id. (citing Teachout v. Forest City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 584 N.W.2d 296, 301-02 
(Iowa 1998)) (holding that employee’s exercise of rights must be the “determinative 
factor” in employer’s adverse action); Guy v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 79 S.W.3d 
528, 535 (Tenn. 2002) (holding that employee’s exercise of rights must be the “moti-
vating factor” in employer’s adverse action); Ryan v. Dan’s Food Stores, Inc., 972 
P.2d 395, 405 (Utah 1998) (holding that employee’s exercise of rights must have been 
a “substantial factor” in employer’s adverse action); Cardwell v. Am. Linen Supply, 
843 P.2d 596, 600 (Wyo. 1992) (holding that employee’s exercise of rights must have 
“significantly motivated” employer’s adverse action). 
 115. Id. at 94. 
 116. Id. (citing 231 S.W.3d 814, 820 (Mo. 2007) (en banc)). 
 117. Under the MHRA, improper reasons for terminating employees include on 
the basis of their “race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age, or disabil-
ity.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 213.055.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 118. Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 94. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 94-95. 
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er’s discrimination or decision to discharge the employee.121  Further, the 
court held that the decisions in Hansome v. Northwestern Cooperage Compa-
ny122 and Crabtree v. Bugby123 were overruled to the extent that they applied 
a different causation standard.124 
A.  The Majority Opinion 
Judge George W. Draper, III, began the majority’s analysis with an 
overview of Missouri’s at-will employment doctrine and the historic con-
struction of Section 287.780.125  To provide this overview, the court exam-
ined several workers’ compensation retaliation cases discussed above: Mitch-
ell, Davis, Hansome, and Crabtree.126  Next, the court turned its attention to 
Fleshner, the foundation for Templemire’s argument.127  First, the court noted 
that Fleshner was a public-policy exception case, while Templemire’s case 
was a statutory exception claim.128  The court further noted that the Fleshner 
court explicitly refused to adopt the exclusive causation standard applied in 
Hansome and its progeny because the Fleshner court believed that: (1) the 
exclusive causation standard would likely discourage employees from filing 
claims, and (2) such an impossible causation standard would fail to accom-
plish the purpose of the public-policy exception to protect the employees that 
were meant to be protected.129 
The court next dismissed W&M’s argument that stare decisis should 
apply, reasoning that precedent should not be followed when it is “clearly 
erroneous and manifestly wrong.”130  The court went on to classify as errone-
ous the holdings in Hansome and Crabtree because it agreed with the Crab-
tree dissent that the “exclusive” language used in both decisions appeared to 
be “plucked out of thin air”131 and was not based on any prior case132 or the 
statute.133 
 
 121. 433 S.W.3d 371, 373 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
 122. 679 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. 1984) (en banc), overruled by Templemire, 433 
S.W.3d 371. 
 123. 967 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. 1998) (en banc), overruled by Templemire, 433 S.W.3d 
371. 
 124. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 373. 
 125. Id. at 376-79. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 378-79. 
 128. Id. at 379. 
 129. Id. (citing Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 93 (Mo. 
2010) (en banc)). 
 130. Id. (quoting Sw. Bell Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 94 S.W.3d 388, 
390-91 (Mo. 2002) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 131. Id. (quoting Crabtree v. Bugby, 967 S.W.2d 66, 74 (Mo. 1998) (en banc), 
overruled by Templemire, 433 S.W.3d 371) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 132. The court was referring to Davis and Mitchell.  Id. 
 133. Id. (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 287.780 (2000)). 
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Next, the court noted that the plain language of Section 287.780 forbids 
discriminating “in any way” against an employee for filing a workers’ com-
pensation claim.134  Furthermore, Section 287.780 was enacted at a time 
when workers’ compensation laws were construed in favor of workers.135  In 
contrast, the court went on, the exclusive causation standard serves as a nar-
row interpretation of Section 287.780, which favors employers.136  The court 
concluded by emphasizing that the exclusive causation standard allows an 
employer to discriminate as long as the discrimination is not the exclusive 
cause of terminating an employee.137  In the court’s view, such a standard 
“effectively deprive[d] an employee’s right to remedy the evil of being dis-
criminated against or discharged for exercising workers’ compensation 
rights,” and cases requiring the plaintiff to prove this standard were over-
ruled.138 
After overruling the exclusive causation standard, the court considered 
what the appropriate causation standard should be.139  It looked for guidance 
in recent Missouri precedent that specifically addressed the proper causation 
standard for proving various forms of employment discrimination, including 
Daugherty,140 Hill,141 and Fleshner.142  Based on the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri’s precedent and the plain language of the statute, the court held that the 
contributing factor standard was the proper standard for Section 287.780 
claims.143 
The court noted that adopting the contributing factor standard served 
two purposes.144  First, it emphasized Section 287.780’s phrase, “in any 
way,” reasoning that the contributing factor standard fulfilled the statute’s 
purpose of prohibiting employers from terminating or discriminating in any 
way against an employee for exercising his or her workers’ compensation 
 
 134. Id. at 381. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See id. 
 137. Id. at 382. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 382-85. 
 140. Id. at 383 (citing Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 
820 (Mo. 2007) (en banc) (holding that a plaintiff must prove that his or her protected 
status under the MHRA was a “contributing factor” to his or her termination or dis-
crimination)). 
 141. Id. (citing Hill v. Ford Motor Co., 277 S.W.3d 659, 665 (Mo. 2009) (en 
banc) (explaining that although the claims for discrimination, as in Daugherty, are 
located in a different MHRA section from claims for retaliation, as in Hill, “there [is] 
no substantive difference between the claims with respect to causation”)). 
 142. Id. at 384 (citing Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 94 
(Mo. 2010) (en banc) (rejecting the exclusive causation standard’s application to both 
the MHRA and the public-policy exception to Missouri’s at-will employment doc-
trine)). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
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rights.145  Second, the court reasoned that the “contributing factor” standard 
“align[ed] workers’ compensation discrimination [laws] with other Missouri 
employment discrimination laws.”146  While the court acknowledged that the 
workers’ compensation laws served a different purpose than the MHRA, it 
vehemently renounced this difference as irrelevant due to policy, stating, 
“[T]here can be no tolerance for employment discrimination in the work-
place.”147 
The court then addressed W&M’s concern that rejecting the exclusive 
causation standard would make Section 287.780 a “job security act,” encour-
aging employees to file workers’ compensation claims for extra job securi-
ty.148  The court dismissed W&M’s concern by noting that since the statute’s 
amendment in 1973, the legislature had created many statutory exceptions to 
Missouri’s at-will employment doctrine.149 
Finally, the court assessed whether Templemire was prejudiced by the 
“exclusive cause” jury instruction rather than the “contributing factor” jury 
instruction.150  The court considered the substantial evidence that Templemire 
had provided to be proof of W&M’s discrimination.151  In the court’s view, 
by instructing the jury that Templemire’s termination had to be exclusively in 
retaliation for his filing a workers’ compensation claim, any evidence of 
some other reason to terminate Templemire would have undermined his 
claim.152  Thus, because the majority found that the “contributing factor” 
standard was the proper causation standard and that Templemire was preju-
diced by the trial court’s use of the exclusive causation standard, it conclud-
ed153 that Templemire was entitled to a new trial.154 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. (“Discrimination against an employee for exercising his or her rights 
under the workers’ compensation law is just as illegal, insidious, and reprehensible as 
discrimination under the MHRA or for retaliatory discharge under the public policy 
exception of the at-will employment doctrine.”). 
 148. Id. at 384-85. 
 149. Id. at 385. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id.  The court found the following evidence persuasive: that “McMullin re-
peatedly yelled at Templemire and complained to others about his injury, characteriz-
ing Templemire as a ‘high maintenance employee’ who ‘s[a]t on his a— and dr[e]w 
[his] money’”; that “other injured workers were belittled for their injuries[,] . . . de-
scribed as ‘whiners,’ [and] did not receive accommodations when injured”; that “one 
[injured worker] was discharged shortly after filing a workers’ compensation claim”; 
that Templemire’s discharge went against W&M’s “progressive discipline policy”; 
and that McMullin told Gragg that Templemire was “milking his injury.”  Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. The court did not address Templemire’s pretext argument because it was 
given in the alternative.  Id. at 385-86.  The court noted that Templemire’s pretext 
concerns were irrelevant now that the jury would be instructed on the contributing 
factor standard, rather than the exclusive causation standard.  Id. 
 154. Id. at 385. 
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B.  The Dissent 
In his dissent, Judge Zel M. Fischer, joined by Judge Wilson, expressed 
that he would have affirmed the trial court’s decision because the trial court 
correctly followed Missouri precedent in Hansome and Crabtree.155  Judge 
Fischer emphasized the importance of stare decisis, and he attributed the 
majority’s decision to change the causation standard to the court’s changing 
membership, rather than to any real legal need to overturn precedent.156  
Agreeing with W&M’s argument, Judge Fischer contended that legislative 
inaction with respect to a court’s statutory interpretations is a form of legisla-
tive ratification, which a court should not overrule.157 
Judge Fischer further argued that the majority erred by relying on 
Fleshner to support its decision to abandon the exclusive causation standard 
because of the distinction between a wrongful termination claim brought un-
der the public-policy exception, as in Fleshner, and a wrongful termination 
claim brought under Section 287.780, as in the instant case.158  Judge Fischer 
concluded his dissent by emphasizing that the precedents set by Hansome and 
Crabtree were interpretations of a statute, and thus, these interpretations 
“should [be] give[n] the greatest stare decisis effect.”159  Further, Judge 
Fischer continued, the General Assembly’s 2005 amendments to the workers’ 
compensation laws and the Assembly’s inaction with respect to Section 
287.780 illustrated the legislature’s intent to retain the exclusive causation 
standard, not abandon it.160  Accordingly, Judge Fischer concluded that the 
majority should have abided by stare decisis, reaffirmed the precedent set by 
Hansome and Crabtree, and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment in favor of 
W&M.161   
V.  COMMENT 
The Supreme Court of Missouri’s recent adoption of the contributing 
factor standard for workers’ compensation retaliation claims has already 
proved controversial among employers and defense attorneys.162  This Part 
begins by assessing the validity of defense attorneys’ concerns in light of how 
the contributing factor standard has already been applied to MHRA claims.  
Next, this Part provides guidance for employers in understanding the contrib-
uting factor standard, examining what constitutes a “contributing factor” and 
what proactive measures employers can take to reduce their future liability.  
 
 155. Id. at 386 (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 156. Id. at 386-87. 
 157. Id. at 387-88. 
 158. Id. at 389. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 390. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See discussion infra Part V.A. 
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Finally, this Part concludes by commenting on the Missouri Legislature’s 
wisdom in not passing proposed legislation that would have overruled Tem-
plemire. 
A.  Causation Complications: What’s All the Fuss About? 
The Templemire court’s decision to adopt the contributing factor causa-
tion standard rather than the exclusive cause standard has already created a 
fair amount of controversy, especially among defense attorneys.163  Defense 
attorneys and plaintiffs’ attorneys alike are justified in their focus on causa-
tion because the applicable causation standard in the employment law context 
has a great deal of practical importance to employment lawyers.164  For in-
stance, the applicable causation standard may make plaintiffs’ attorneys more 
or less likely to take a case, and the causation standard may dictate whether a 
case survives the summary judgment stage.165  Further, the causation standard 
given in jury instructions may dramatically influence jurors’ decisions about 
liability for or against the employer.166 
Within mere days of the Templemire decision, defense attorneys re-
sponded by posting legal news updates online, sounding the alarm for their 
employer clients with foreboding article titles such as, “Employers Beware: 
Missouri Supreme Court Heightens the Risk of Dismissing Employees Who 
Filed Workers Compensation Claims”167 and “Missouri Supreme Court 
Makes it Easier for Employees to Pursue Workers’ Compensation Retaliation 
Claims.”168  Defense attorneys voiced concerns about the negative repercus-
sions following the contributing factor standard’s recent adoption, including 
concerns that the standard would allow weak employee claims to prevail, 
encourage the filing of frivolous lawsuits, increase the total number of law-
suits, and make it virtually impossible for employers to obtain summary 
judgment.169 
 
 163. See, e.g., C. Brooks Wood, Missouri Supreme Court Makes It Easier for 
Employees to Pursue Workers’ Compensation Retaliation Claims, LEXOLOGY (June 
30, 2014), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2224358e-a9b2-41af-
ae48-e1809836cddf; see also Jacquelyn M. Meirick, Missouri Supreme Court Lowers 
Employees’ Burden of Proof in Workers’ Compensation Retaliation Claims, 
LEXOLOGY (Apr. 21, 2014), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f02d0
ed8-537f-4d60-a11e-0d747111dfe5. 
 164. See generally Mark J. Oberti & Richard T. Seymour, Causation Issues in 
Employment Law, CV001 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 959 (2013). 
 165. Id. at 967. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Timothy J. Sarsfield et al., Employers Beware: Missouri Supreme Court 
Heightens the Risk of Dismissing Employees Who Filed Workers Compensation 
Claims, LEXOLOGY (May 5, 2014), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g
=7d8b759e-fb99-44d5-9fad-315072ded058. 
 168. Wood, supra note 163. 
 169. See id. 
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As of this writing, Templemire was the only workers’ compensation re-
taliation claim in which the contributing factor standard had been applied.  
Thus, whether defense attorneys’ concerns about the standard are warranted 
will only be determined with time and with future applications of the standard 
to Section 287.780 claims.  Still, because the Templemire court’s decision 
was largely influenced by the standard’s adoption for other areas of Missouri 
employment law – the MHRA in 2007 and the public-policy exception in 
2010170 – the way that the contributing factor standard has been applied to 
these claims sheds some light on the similar sort of consequences that defense 
attorneys can expect as a result of the standard’s application to Section 
287.780 claims.  This section analyzes such cases to better evaluate some of 
defense attorneys’, and presumably employers’, concerns about the stand-
ard’s application to Section 287.780.171 
First, employers worry that workers will have an easier time proving 
weak claims under the contributing factor standard, which will encourage the 
filing of frivolous lawsuits.172  One defense attorney, for instance, described 
this concern by noting that under the contributing factor standard, “the em-
ployee can recover even if discriminatory intent was, for example, 10% of the 
reason for the job action.”173  This is likely an accurate representation of how 
the contributing factor standard operates in theory, but in practice, such dra-
matically weak claims are not being litigated, much less producing employee 
victories.174  In contrast, existing case law suggests that when claims are 
 
 170. Templemire v. W&M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371, 376, 383 (Mo. 2014) 
(en banc). 
 171. Cases that pre-date the adoption of the contributing factor standard for 
MHRA and public-policy exception claims are largely unhelpful in this endeavor.  
Thus, this inquiry is limited to MHRA claims after Daugherty v. City of Maryland 
Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814 (Mo. 2007) (en banc), and to public-policy exception claims 
after Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81 (Mo. 2010) (en banc). 
 172. See Wood, supra note 163. 
 173. Id. 
 174. For representative MHRA claims applying the contributing factor standard in 
which the employee prevailed by providing robust evidence, see, for example, Hurst 
v. Kan. City, Mo. Sch. Dist., 437 S.W.3d 327 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (affirming jury 
verdict entered for sixty-one-year-old school district employee who established that 
her age was a contributing factor in the employer’s decision to eliminate her position 
where evidence included that the district did not re-hire the four eldest applicants, 
hired the four substantially younger applicants, and created suspicious and contradic-
tory new hiring standards to justify eliminating the four older employees); Leeper v. 
Scorpio Supply IV, LLC, 351 S.W.3d 784 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (affirming jury ver-
dict entered for two female employees who established that their sex was a contrib-
uting factor in the harassment where evidence included ongoing instances of inappro-
priate physical sexual force, sexual comments, and stalking carried out by both a store 
manager and a supervisor); Williams v. Trans States Airlines, Inc., 281 S.W.3d 854 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (affirming jury verdict entered for flight attendant employee who 
established that her complaint of a pilot sexually harassing her was a contributing 
factor in her termination where evidence included the legitimacy of her complaint, her 
18
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weak, the employer – not the employee – prevails at both the summary judg-
ment stage and at trial.175  Furthermore, courts still appear to require robust 
levels of evidence for plaintiff employees to prevail on employment discrimi-
nation claims, even with the contributing factor standard.176  Employers are 
undoubtedly correct that employees will have a comparatively “easier” time 
proving their claims than they had under the harsher exclusive cause stand-
ard, but the evidence suggests that employees will not prevail on legitimately 
weak claims, contrary to employers’ fears.177 
With that said, some less-than-compelling employment discrimination 
claims do sometimes make it to trial,178 and quite plausibly, an increased 
number of legitimately frivolous employment discrimination cases may be 
settling out of court.  Further, the contributing factor standard provides work-
ers with greater leverage in settlement negotiations, and employers may be 
more likely to pay settlements for weaker workers’ compensation retaliations 
claims as a result.  Still, the fact that these frivolous claims are not making it 
to trial and resulting in visible victories for employees suggests that employ-
ers’ concerns – that workers will be incentivized to file more frivolous law-
suits than under the exclusive cause standard – are likely unfounded. 
Second, employers worry that the contributing factor standard’s adop-
tion for Section 287.780 claims will produce a “significant uptick in lawsuits 
 
good work record prior to the complaint, the proximity in time between the complaint 
and termination, and the poor performance records that followed the complaint as 
pretext for her termination); Stanley v. JerDen Foods, Inc., 263 S.W.3d 800 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2008) (affirming jury verdict entered for employee who established that his age 
was a contributing factor to his demotion and termination where evidence included 
that supervisor told employee that the business owner wished to replace him with a 
younger man, asked him how old he was, and advised him to consider retirement). 
 175. For representative cases in which the employer prevailed over a less-
compelling claim, despite the contributing factor standard, see, for example, Fields v. 
United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 4:11CV581 CDP, 2012 WL 3871980 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 6, 
2012) (granting summary judgment to UPS employer in MHRA claim and noting that 
employee failed to provide evidence demonstrating that his diabetes-related disability 
was a contributing factor to UPS’s termination decision where UPS had documented 
the employee’s ongoing dishonest conduct and other violations of company policy), 
aff’d per curiam, 511 F. App’x 600 (8th Cir. 2013); McCullough v. Commerce Bank, 
349 S.W.3d 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (affirming jury verdict entered for bank em-
ployer where sixty-one-year-old African American employee alleged violation of the 
MHRA in that his race and age were a contributing factor in the bank’s decision to 
terminate him, while the bank alleged that employee was fired because of an investi-
gation revealing four unauthorized account transfers); Pittman v. Ripley Cnty. Mem’l 
Hosp., 318 S.W.3d 289 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (affirming jury verdict entered for hospi-
tal employer where employee alleged violation of the MHRA in that her filing of a 
sexual harassment complaint was a contributing factor in the hospital’s decision not to 
promote her). 
 176. See cases cited supra notes 174-75. 
 177. See cases cited supra notes 174-75. 
 178. See, e.g., Anderson v. Shade Tree Servs. Co., No. 4:12CV01066 ERW, 2013 
WL 3884166 (E.D. Mo. July 26, 2013); McCullough, 349 S.W.3d 389. 
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claiming some form of retaliation.”179  This may very well be the case.  Be-
cause the Templemire decision effectively broadens the definition of retalia-
tion and discrimination under Section 287.780, more worker claims will satis-
fy the contributing factor standard than would have satisfied the exclusive 
cause standard.180  Further, plaintiffs’ attorneys may be more likely to take on 
Section 287.780 claims that, prior to Templemire, they would have declined. 
With the new standard’s adoption, workers may feel more empowered 
to file claims against their employers in the first place because of the greater 
likelihood that they will recover.181  The net result is that Templemire is likely 
to produce a greater number of claims against employers, just as defense at-
torneys have predicted.182  Although this is certainly a troubling result for 
employers, such a result is debatably a positive one for Missouri: assuming 
that the resulting increase in filed claims against employers is composed of 
legitimate claims of discrimination or retaliation under Section 287.780, 
wronged workers are clearly justified in litigating such claims.183 
Finally, employers fear that the contributing factor standard’s adoption 
will make it “as scarce to obtain summary judgment – dismissal by the court 
before trial – in workers’ compensation retaliation cases as it now is in em-
ployment discrimination and retaliation cases.”184  This prediction has some 
merit but is arguably hyperbolic.  With the standard’s adoption for MHRA 
claims in 2007, the Supreme Court of Missouri advised, “Summary judgment 
should seldom be used in employment discrimination cases, because such 
cases are inherently fact-based and often depend on inferences rather than on 
direct evidence.”185  There is little question that summary judgment is more 
difficult to obtain in employment discrimination and retaliation cases under 
the contributing factor standard than it was under the exclusive cause stand-
ard.  This is because under the exclusive cause standard, if the employer 
could demonstrate any valid and non-pretextual reason for terminating the 
employee, even if the employee’s protected class or activity was the primary 
reason behind the employer’s act, then summary judgment could plausibly be 
granted for the employer.186 
Still, deeming summary judgment’s occurrence as “scarce” is probably 
an overstatement.  Despite the exclusive cause standard’s adoption for 
MHRA claims and the court’s warning to avoid using summary judgment for 
 
 179. Wood, supra note 163. 
 180. See Templemire v. W&M Welding, Inc. 433 S.W.3d 371, 384-85 (Mo. 2014) 
(en banc). 
 181. See id. 
 182. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 163. 
 183. See Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 382 (noting that the exclusive cause standard 
“effectively deprive[d] an employee’s right to remedy the evil of being discriminated 
against or discharged for exercising workers’ compensation rights”). 
 184. Wood, supra note 163. 
 185. Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 818 (Mo. 2007) 
(en banc). 
 186. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text. 
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employment discrimination cases, the evidence demonstrates that prevailing 
on summary judgment is still feasible and a somewhat regular occurrence for 
employers.187  Therefore, employers can still expect to win on summary 
judgment for some future Section 287.780 claims, though as defense attor-
neys warn, summary judgment will not be granted as liberally as it may have 
been under the exclusive cause standard. 
Although Templemire’s adoption of the contributing factor standard will 
lead to some frustrating consequences for employers, the overall effect of 
adopting the contributing factor standard over the exclusive cause standard is 
a positive one, moving Missouri employment law in a more equitable direc-
tion.  Consider Mr. Templemire, for instance.188  His claim of wrongful dis-
charge in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim was supported 
by substantial and compelling evidence that his exercising of his Section 
287.780 rights played a significant role in his employer’s decision to termi-
nate him.189  And yet, as illustrated at both the trial court and appellate court 
levels, even a compelling and legitimate claim of blatant retaliation like Tem-
plemire’s still could not survive the exclusive cause standard.190  Where even 
strong claims like Templemire’s were failing, it was clear that the causation 
standard for Section 287.780 claims needed improvement.  Under Temple-
mire, the contributing factor standard’s adoption corrects this mistake and 
properly places workers on more equal footing with employers when it comes 
to litigating Section 287.780 claims. 
Furthermore, Missouri’s renewed interest in protecting workers from 
workplace injuries and any resulting retaliation arguably outweighs employer 
concerns about future increased liability.191  Employers are protected from 
 
 187. For various instances of courts granting employers summary judgment under 
the contributing factor standard, see, for example, Porter v. City of Lake Lotawana, 
651 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 2011) (applying Missouri law and affirming District Court’s 
granting of summary judgment for employer on MHRA wrongful termination 
claims); Carter v. CSL Plasma Inc., No. 4:13-CV-00814-FJG, 2014 WL 5438374 
(W.D. Mo. Oct. 24, 2014) (applying Missouri law and granting summary judgment 
for employer on MHRA gender discrimination and retaliation claims); Shirrell v. 
Saint Francis Med. Ctr., 24 F. Supp. 3d 851 (E.D. Mo. 2014) (applying Missouri law 
and granting summary judgment for employer on MHRA religious discrimination 
claim); Fields v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 4:11CV581 CDP, 2012 WL 3871980 
(E.D. Mo. Sept. 6, 2012) (applying Missouri law and granting summary judgment to 
UPS employer in MHRA disability-related wrongful termination claim), aff’d per 
curiam, 511 F. App’x 600 (8th Cir. 2013); Hilfiker v. Gideon Sch. Dist. No. 37, 403 
S.W.3d 667 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (granting summary judgment for employer on 
MHRA age discrimination claim). 
 188. See discussion supra Parts II, IV. 
 189. See discussion supra Parts II, IV. 
 190. See Templemire v. W&M Welding, Inc., No. WD 74681, 2012 WL 6681950, 
at *7 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2012) (affirming trial court judgment entered in favor of 
employer W&M), rev’d, 433 S.W.3d 371 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
 191. See Templemire v. W&M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371, 384 (Mo. 2014) 
(en banc) (interpreting Section 287.780’s purpose as prohibiting employers from 
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future liability in their capacity to respond proactively to the contributing 
factor standard’s adoption: by applying clear anti-discriminatory disciplinary 
policies in the workplace and avoiding discrimination or retaliation against 
injured workers.192  In contrast, employees lack this option; employees have 
nothing more than those protections provided by Section 287.780.  Thus, on 
balance, the contributing factor standard’s adoption for Section 287.780 
claims, even if more employee-friendly, makes good sense for Missouri. 
As with any change, however, unintended consequences may arise out 
of the standard’s application to future Section 287.780 claims, some of which 
may negatively impact employers.  Therefore, as future Section 287.780 
claims arise and the contributing factor standard is applied, Missouri courts 
and the legislature must diligently re-evaluate the standard’s consequences, 
whether intended or not, while keeping both employer and employee interests 
in mind. 
B.  The Employer’s Guide to the Contributing Factor Standard 
The Templemire decision’s adoption of the contributing factor standard 
for Section 287.780 claims represents a dramatic change in workers’ compen-
sation retaliation law, a change that encourages employers to take steps to 
reduce future liability.  Unfortunately for employers, the novelty of the con-
tributing factor’s application to Section 287.780 claims means uncertainty – 
aside from Templemire, there is virtually no guidance as to what a contrib-
uting factor looks like within the context of a workers’ compensation retalia-
tion claim.  While Templemire clearly adopted the contributing factor stand-
ard for claims brought under Section 287.780, what facts are sufficient to 
prove this standard remain a mystery.  As a result, employers are left with 
scant guidance as to how to proactively adapt their workplace policies or how 
to handle future Section 287.780 claims.  This section provides information 
on what employers can expect from the contributing factor standard’s adop-
tion for Section 287.780 claims, as well as guidance for how employers can 
proactively respond. 
First, the way that courts have interpreted and defined the contributing 
factor standard in recent MHRA and public-policy exception cases sheds 
light on how the contributing factor standard will likely be applied within the 
workers’ compensation retaliation context.193  So, what is a “contributing 
factor”?  Notably, the Missouri Court of Appeals recently denied an employ-
er’s contention that the trial court erred by failing to provide a definition of 
 
terminating or discriminating in any way against an employee for exercising his or her 
worker’s compensation rights). 
 192. See discussion infra Part V.B. 
 193. Cases that pre-date the adoption of the contributing factor standard for 
MHRA and public-policy exception claims are largely unhelpful in this endeavor.  
Thus, this inquiry is limited to MHRA claims after Daugherty v. City of Maryland 
Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814 (Mo. 2007) (en banc), and to public-policy exception claims 
after Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81 (Mo. 2010) (en banc). 
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“contributing factor” to the jury.194  The Court of Appeals, instead, held that 
the contributing factor standard did not require additional definition for the 
jury because the words are “commonly used and readily understandable.”195 
What, then, would a reasonable juror understand “contributing factor” to 
mean?  One dictionary defines a “contributing factor” as “something that is 
partly responsible for a development or phenomenon.”196  As such, jurors will 
likely interpret this standard to mean that an employee’s filing of a workers’ 
compensation claim need only be “partly responsible” for an employer’s de-
cision to terminate the employee for it to constitute a contributing factor.  
Similarly, Missouri courts have defined a “contributing factor” as a factor 
“that contributed a share in anything or has a part in producing the effect.”197 
Also informative for employers is that the contributing factor standard 
requires a lower threshold of proof than employment discrimination claims 
brought under federal law.198  The Missouri Court of Appeals explained the 
effective difference in standards: under Missouri law, an employee “can re-
cover so long as her complaint of discrimination was ‘a reason’ for termina-
tion, whereas under federal law, [an employee] can recover only if her com-
plaint of discrimination was ‘the reason’ for her termination.”199 
Perhaps even more telling is how courts assess the evidence for why the 
employee was terminated.  For purposes of summary judgment, for example, 
the court is not focused on an employer’s extensive proof that its decision to 
terminate an employee was justified.200  Instead, the court’s focus is on 
whether the employee’s protected class or activity played any role in the em-
ployer’s decision to terminate the employee, even when coupled with exten-
 
 194. DeWalt v. Davidson Serv./Air, Inc., 398 S.W.3d 491, 505 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2013) (rejecting defendant employer’s argument that the trial court erred by not defin-
ing the term “contributing factor” for the jury because the term has a legal or tech-
nical meaning that would mislead or confuse the jury). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Contributing Factor, COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.collinsdict-
ionary.com/dictionary/english/contributing-factor (last visited Apr. 12, 2015) (empha-
sis added). 
 197. Williams v. Trans States Airlines, Inc., 281 S.W.3d 854, 867 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2009) (quoting McBryde v. Ritenour Sch. Dist., 207 S.W.3d 162, 170 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 198. Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at 818-19 (explicitly rejecting the federal frame-
work’s application to employment discrimination claims brought under Missouri law 
and noting that Missouri’s discrimination safeguards are not identical and offer great-
er protection). 
 199. Porter v. City of Lake Lotawana, 651 F.3d 894, 898 (8th Cir. 2011) (empha-
sis added) (applying Missouri law to a MHRA claim and noting that Missouri’s con-
tributing factor standard is more lenient than the federal standard). 
 200. Hilfiker v. Gideon Sch. Dist. No. 37, 403 S.W.3d 667, 670 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2012) (noting the irrelevance of the employer’s extensive proof that its termination 
decision was justified and noting instead the comparatively greater importance of 
evidence that the employee’s age played some role in the employer’s termination 
decision). 
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sive proof that the termination was justified.201  Finally, in contrast to the 
federal standard, employees bringing employment discrimination claims un-
der Missouri law are not required to show that the employer treated “similar-
ly-situated” employees differently, just that the protected characteristic con-
tributed to the wrongful termination.202 
The previous discussion illustrates the way that the contributing factor 
standard has been defined for MHRA and public-policy claims in Missouri, 
which is likely indicative of how the standard will be defined for future Sec-
tion 287.780 claims.203  But, what exactly does a “contributing factor” look 
like, and just how little evidence can workers provide to satisfy this new 
standard?  Currently, Templemire provides the sole example of what consti-
tutes sufficient evidence to prove a Section 287.780 claim under the contrib-
uting factor standard.  The Templemire court found the following evidence 
persuasive: that a supervisor “repeatedly yelled at [the employee] and com-
plained to others about his injury, characterizing [him] as a ‘high mainte-
nance employee’ who ‘s[a]t on his a— and dr[e]w [his] money’”; that 
“[o]ther injured workers were belittled for their injuries[,] . . . described as 
‘whiners,’ and did not receive accommodations” for their injuries; that anoth-
er employee was terminated “shortly after filing a workers’ compensation 
claim”; that the employee’s termination was “contrary to [the] [e]mployer’s 
progressive discipline policy”; and that a supervisor stated to the workers’ 
compensation insurance claims adjuster that “he believed [the employee] was 
‘milking his injury.’”204  Templemire’s list of sufficient evidence under the 
contributing factor standard is not an exhaustive one, however, and because 
employment disputes revolve around the credibility of witnesses and issues of 
fact, the contributing factor standard will require significant fine-tuning with 
each new case.  Furthermore, future determinations of whether certain facts 
are sufficient proof of discriminatory intent will largely be in the hands of 
jurors and judges. 
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the new standard’s adoption, em-
ployers still have several strategies available to them, and summary judgment 
is still a viable option in many cases.  MHRA claims in which the employer 
was granted summary judgment provide some guidance for how employers 
can adapt their workplace policies to better insulate themselves from liability. 
Existing case law suggests three factors that may mean the difference 
between a grant or denial of summary judgment under the contributing factor 
standard: (1) the decision maker’s lack of knowledge that the employee filed 
 
 201. Id. 
 202. Holmes v. Kan. City Mo. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 364 S.W.3d 615, 626-27 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2012). 
 203. See Templemire v. W&M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371, 383 (Mo. 2014) 
(en banc) (citing Hill v. Ford Motor Co., 277 S.W.3d 659, 665 (Mo. 2009) (en banc)) 
(explaining that although the claims for discrimination, as in Daugherty, are located 
in a different MHRA section from claims for retaliation, as in Hill, “there [is] no 
substantive difference between the claims with respect to causation”). 
 204. Id. at 385. 
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a workers’ compensation claim prior to his decision to terminate the employ-
ee;205 (2) a lack of evidence suggesting that the employee’s workers’ com-
pensation claim was considered in the employer’s decision to terminate 
him;206 and (3) a thorough, well-documented history of the employee’s poor 
performance or insubordination, coupled with termination that complies with 
the employer’s disciplinary policy.207 
Unfortunately, this first factor may not be as helpful to employers de-
fending against Section 287.780 claims as it is for employers defending 
against MHRA claims208 because to qualify for workers’ compensation bene-
fits, the employee must report a workplace injury to his supervisor.209  Fur-
ther, a workplace injury can be catastrophic and is often highly visible to 
employees and supervisors, unlike a quiet instance of discriminatory harass-
 
 205. Cf., e.g., Porter v. City of Lake Lotawana, 651 F.3d 894, 898-99 (8th Cir. 
2011) (affirming the District Court’s granting of summary judgment for the employer 
because the “decision makers” who terminated the employee provided sworn testimo-
ny that they were unaware of the employee’s discrimination complaint when they 
decided to terminate her).  But see Anderson v. Shade Tree Servs. Co., No. 
4:12CV01066 ERW, 2013 WL 3884166, at *9 (E.D. Mo. July 26, 2013) (denying 
employer’s motion for summary judgment primarily because the decision maker 
knew of employee’s drug addiction, the alleged disability, which the court found may 
have influenced the decision maker and could be construed as a contributing factor).  
Anderson suggests that a decision maker’s mere knowledge of the employee’s pro-
tected characteristic or activity may be sufficient to defeat an employer’s motion for 
summary judgment.  See id. 
 206. Cf., e.g., Shirrell v. Saint Francis Med. Ctr., 24 F. Supp. 3d 851, 860 (E.D. 
Mo. 2014) (granting summary judgment for employer on MHRA claim, in part be-
cause there was no evidence that the final decision maker’s awareness of employee’s 
Jewish heritage played any role in her decision to terminate employee); Hilfiker v. 
Gideon Sch. Dist. No. 37, 403 S.W.3d 667, 670-72 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (granting 
summary judgment for employer on MHRA age discrimination claim because the 
total lack of evidence that the employee’s supervisors had spoken in ways suggestive 
of age discrimination, coupled with the employee’s mere personal opinion that he was 
terminated because of his age, was insufficient to prove that his age was a contrib-
uting factor in the employer’s decision to terminate him). 
 207. See, e.g., Shirrell, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 860-61 (granting summary judgment for 
hospital on MHRA claims for several reasons, including that employer provided thor-
ough documentation of patient complaints about the nurse employee, her attendance 
policy violations, and her negligent performance of job duties, all of which warranted 
discharge under the employer’s “Progressive Corrective Action Policy”). 
 208. See, e.g., Porter, 651 F.3d at 898-99. 
 209. See MO. REV. STAT. § 287.420 (Cum. Supp. 2013) (“No proceedings for 
compensation for any accident under this chapter shall be maintained unless written 
notice of the time, place and nature of the injury, and the name and address of the 
person injured, has been given to the employer no later than thirty days after the acci-
dent, unless the employer was not prejudiced by failure to receive the notice.”). 
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ment.210  As a result, the “decision maker” who decides to terminate the em-
ployee will most likely be aware of the employee’s workplace injury and his 
filing for workers’ compensation.  Thus, employers arguing for summary 
judgment on Section 287.780 claims will generally be unable to argue that the 
employment decision maker was unaware of the employee’s workers’ com-
pensation claim at the time he was terminated. 
Still, the remaining two factors do provide guidance for employers con-
cerned about limiting their liability.  First, when workplace injuries occur, 
employers must be hyper-vigilant about their responses.211  Employers must 
refrain from making any comments about general workplace injuries or an 
individual’s injury, especially comments that could be construed negative-
ly.212  As previously demonstrated, a plaintiff-employee cannot make a case 
based on her mere opinion that discrimination occurred; she must have some 
level of circumstantial evidence suggesting discrimination.213  Logically, 
providing an employee with any substantive reason to believe that her em-
ployer retaliated against her based on her workplace injury or her filing for 
benefits increases an employer’s liability. 
Second, employers should re-visit their disciplinary action policies and 
consistently follow them.  These policies should clearly define exactly what 
employee misconduct warrants termination, how misconduct is handled, and 
how many instances of misconduct and warnings are required before termina-
tion is appropriate.  Following these disciplinary policies is vital – W&M’s 
departure from its disciplinary policy in Templemire was one element of Mr. 
Templemire’s case used to prove the contributing factor standard.214  In addi-
tion, employers should note that legitimate, extensive, and well-documented 
grounds for employee dismissal can still insulate employers from liability 
under the contributing factor standard, so long as there is no evidence sug-
 
 210. See, e.g., Templemire v. W&M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371, 373 (Mo. 
2014) (en banc) (employee was severely injured when a large beam fell from a fork-
lift and crushed his foot). 
 211. See Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 381 (reversing and remanding for employ-
ee’s workers’ compensation retaliation claim where evidence included that employer 
referred to injured employees as “whiners” and stated that the employee was “milking 
his injury”); cf., e.g., Stanley v. JerDen Foods, Inc., 263 S.W.3d 800, 804 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2008) (affirming jury verdict entered for employee who established that his age 
was a contributing factor to his demotion and termination where evidence included 
that supervisor told employee that the business owner wished to replace him with a 
younger man, asked him how old he was, and advised him to consider retirement). 
 212. Cf. Stanley, 263 S.W.3d at 804. 
 213. See, e.g., Shirrell v. Saint Francis Med. Ctr., 24 F. Supp. 3d 851, 859 (E.D. 
Mo. 2014); see also Fields v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 4:11CV581 CDP, 2012 
WL 3871980, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 6, 2012), aff’d per curiam, 511 F. App’x 600 (8th 
Cir. 2013). 
 214. See Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 385. 
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gesting that the employee’s workers’ compensation claim played a factor in 
the decision.215 
C.  The Impact of Proposed Legislation 
As of this writing, proposed legislation that would have amended Sec-
tion 287.780 did not pass.216  Had it passed, however, HB 1468 would have 
put the causation issue to rest and overruled Templemire.217  The proposed 
amendment specifically mandated that to recover for wrongful termination, a 
worker’s exercising of Chapter 287 rights must be the “exclusive cause” for 
the employer’s termination or discrimination of the worker.218 
As previously discussed, adoption of this strict causation standard would 
have swung the pendulum back to favor employers over workers, making it 
virtually impossible for workers to recover under Section 287.780, potentially 
discouraging workers from filing workers’ compensation claims, insulating 
employers from liability under Section 287.780, and sanctioning discrimina-
tion and retaliation against injured workers that is accompanied by some oth-
er motive.219  Furthermore, this legislation would have again caused Mis-
souri’s workers’ compensation law to be inconsistent with the remainder of 
Missouri’s modern employment law.220  As such, Missouri law would have 
returned to providing disparate protection for at-will employees, depending 
on whether their claims were brought under the MHRA, public policy, or 
Section 287.780. 
 
 215. See, e.g., Wallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 563 F.3d 357, 361 (8th Cir. 
2009) (stating, while noting that the employer’s presentation of documented poor 
performance by the employee was a potentially legitimate explanation for terminating 
him, that “[b]ased on the trial record, it would have been reasonable for a jury to have 
accepted either of these explanations and to have found that retaliation was not a 
contributing factor in [the employee’s] termination”); see also Al-Birekdar v. Chrys-
ler Grp., LLC, 499 F. App’x 641, 647 (8th Cir. 2013) (finding that employer’s presen-
tation of well-documented, reported complaints about employee was a “valid alterna-
tive rationale for [the employee’s] termination,” but jury also reasonably could have 
found that his termination was in retaliation for filing a complaint about discrimina-
tion); Shirrell, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 860-61; Fields, 2012 WL 3871980, at *3; 
McCullough v. Commerce Bank, 349 S.W.3d 389, 391-92 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011). 
 216. See H.B. 1468, 97th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2014); see also supra 
Part III.B. 
 217. See H.B. 1468 (proposing to amend Section 287.780 to adopt the exclusive 
cause standard); see also Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 384 (holding that the exclusive 
cause standard no longer applied to claims brought under Section 287.780). 
 218. See H.B. 1468. 
 219. See supra text accompanying notes 112-13, 136-38. 
 220. See supra text accompanying notes 146-47. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
How should the Templemire decision be regarded?  There is no question 
that Templemire increases employer liability for Section 287.780 claims.  As 
previously discussed, however, employers can implement proactive measures 
to effectively prevent such claims from arising in the first place, including 
revisiting their disciplinary policies and maintaining fair and non-
discriminatory employment practices.  Further, slight modifications to em-
ployers’ workplace practices now will help employers defend against Section 
287.780 claims when they arise later. 
Arguably, no causation standard is perfect, including the contributing 
factor standard.  Moreover, there is little doubt that the causation standard 
will remain the center of debate between plaintiffs’ attorneys and defense 
attorneys, employers and employees.  With that said, Templemire represents a 
step in the right direction, and Missouri’s strong interest in protecting work-
ers from workplace injuries and any resulting retaliation or discrimination 
supports the current balance present in Section 287.780 claims.  If the con-
tributing factor standard is applied to future Section 287.780 claims in the 
seemingly fair manner that it has been applied to MHRA and public-policy 
claims,221 the contributing factor standard will represent a satisfying alterna-
tive to the exclusive cause standard. 
Of course, only time will tell what consequences, both intended and un-
intended, will arise from the contributing factor standard’s application to Sec-
tion 287.780 claims.  Despite this uncertainty, Templemire’s adoption of the 
contributing factor standard rightfully indicates a renewed concern for pro-
tecting Missouri workers, the very impetus behind the Missouri legislature’s 
creation of the original Missouri Workers’ Compensation Act in 1925.  Re-
gardless of whether one agrees with the Templemire decision, there is no 
denying that Missouri employment law is now more consistent than before 
and sends a clear message to employers that “there [will] be no tolerance for 
employment discrimination in the workplace,” no matter if it is based on pro-
tected classes under the MHRA or based on the exercising of workers’ com-
pensation rights under Section 287.780.222 
 
 
 221. See discussion supra Part V.A. 
 222. Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 384. 
28
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol80/iss2/12
